Ct. Rep. 593, 595; Perrine v. Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. 9 How. Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall.

it to be competent for the state to forbid all teaching of the two races together, in the same institution at the same time, no matter by whom the teaching was done. One part may stand, while another will fall, unless the two are so connected or dependent on each other in subject matter, meaning, or purpose that the good cannot remain without the bad.

The language of the statute is not in terms and amendment, yet its effect is an amendment, and it would be resting too much on mere form to hold that a statute which in effect works a change in the terms of the charter is not to be considered as an amendment, because not so designated. Ct. Rep. 174, 181, cited by the court. Again, the decision by a state court of the extent and limitation of the powers conferred by the state upon one of its own corporations is of a purely local nature. A motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial having been overruled, the case was taken to the highest court of Kentucky, where the judgment of conviction was affirmed, one of the members of the court dissenting. [123 Ky. 228, 94 S. W. , 44 S. L. ed.

The defense was based in part on that statute, and the question was whether the statute was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, in that, after prescribing penalties for its violation, it provided by a distinct section ( 9) that its provisions 'shall not apply to agricultural products or live stock while in the hands of the producer or raiser.' Perrine v. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. A motion in arrest of judgment and for a new trial having been overruled, the case was taken to the highest court of Kentucky, where the judgment of conviction was affirmed, one of the members of the court dissenting. The result is that the statute must be regarded as an entirety, and, in that view, it must be adjudged to be unconstitutional as denying the equal protection of the laws to those within its jurisdiction who are not embraced by the ninth section.". Who can say that the legislature would have enacted one provision without the other? The denial of either right would be an infringement of the liberty inherent in the freedom secured by the fundamental law.

120 - 84, 26 L. ed. ", "SEC. 446, 451; Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Lyman, 15 Wall. [211 U.S. 45, 51]

The college was soon charged with violating the law and was criminally convicted and fined $1,000.

The statute here in question does not purport to amend the charter of any particular corporation, but assumes to establish a certain rule applicable alike to all individuals, associations, or corporations that assume to teach the white and black races.
179

Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water Power Co. 104 Mass. The prohibition in § 1 of the Kentucky statute of 1904 against persons and corporations maintaining schools for both white persons and negroes is separable, and even if an unconstitutional restraint as to individuals, it is not unconstitutional as to corporations, it being within the power of the state to determine the powers conferred upon its corporations. Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court: There is no dispute as to the facts. the founders was to establish and maintain an institution of learning "in order to promote the cause of Christ." Upon this we remark that when a state court decides a case upon two grounds, one Federal and the other non-Federal, this court will not disturb the judgment if the non-Federal ground, fairly construed, sustains the decision. That such was its intention is evident from the title of the act, which, as we have seen, was 'to prohibit white and colored persons from attending the same school.' 'But,' the court took care by say, 'the insuperable difficulty with the application of that principle of construction to the present instance is, that by rejecting the exceptions intended by the legislature of Georgia, the statute is made to enact what confessedly the legislature never meant.' The reference at the close of its opinion, in the words above quoted, to the fact that the defendant was a corporation, which could be controlled as the state saw fit, was, as already suggested, only incidental to the main question determined by the court as to the extent to which the state could control the teaching of the two races in the same institution. Again, the decision by a state court of the extent and limitation of the powers conferred by the state upon one of its own corporations is of a purely local nature. U.S. 580, 586 Insofar as Berea College was the only integrated educational institution in Kentucky, it was clearly the target of the Day Law. ", "SEC. 318, 319, and again in Loeb v. Columbia Twp. Further, in the brief of counsel for the defendant is given a history of the incorporation proceedings, together with the charters. If it had regarded the authority of the state over its own corporations as being, in itself, and without reference to any other view, sufficient to sustain the statute, so far as the defendant corporation is concerned, it need only have said that much, and omitted all consideration of the general power of the state to forbid the teaching of the two races together, by anybody, in the same institution at the same time. The trial court refused an instruction asked by the defendant, to the effect that the statute was in violation of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. [211 U.S. 45, 67]

This court has more than once said that the liberty guaranteed by the 14th Amendment embraces 'the right of the citizen to be free in the en- If not, then, in determining the intent of the legislature, the provisions of the statute relating to the teaching of the two races together by corporations cannot be separated in its operation from those in the same section that forbid such teaching by individuals and unincorporated associations. The answer to this suggestion is that, in the eye of the law, the right to enjoy one's religious belief, unmolested by any human power, is no more sacred nor more fully or distinctly recognized than is the right to impart and receive instruction not harmful to the public. The trial court refused an instruction asked by the defendant to the effect that the statute was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Be on the lookout for your Britannica newsletter to get trusted stories delivered right to your inbox.

Find Law - Berea College v. com.
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. Ct. Rep. 988, 990, the question arose as to the validity of a particular section of the Georgia Code. That provision is, in my opinion, made an essential element in the policy of the statute, and, if regard be had to the object and purpose of this legislation, it cannot be treated as separable, nor intended to be separated from the provisions relating to corporations. It was the teaching of pupils of the two races together, or in the same school, no matter by whom or under whose authority, which the legislature sought to prevent. [Ky.] 553), which act was amended by an act of March 10, 1856 (2 Id. [211 U.S. 45, 55] And when a state statute is so interpreted, this Court should hesitate before it holds that the supreme court of the state did not know what was the thought of the legislature in its enactment. Its right to teach is such as the state sees fit to give to it. 115-117, 6 Sup.

There is no magic in the fact of incorporation which will so transform the act of teaching the two races in the same school at the same time that such teaching can be deemed lawful when conducted by private individuals, but unlawful when conducted by the representatives of corporations. But it is unnecessary for us to consider anything more than the question of its validity as applied to corporation.

The purpose and scope of the act is clearly indicated by its title.

The plaintiff in error, Berea College, is an incorporation, organized under the General Laws of Kentucky in 1859. The Constitution of 1891, provided in § 3 of the Bill of Rights that 'every grant of a franchise, privilege, or exemption shall remain, subject to revocation, alteration, or amendment.'

  Copyright © 2020, Thomson Reuters. Ct. Rep. 267, 274. Having agreed to hear the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals. The email address cannot be subscribed. Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway v. McCann, 174 U. S. 580, 174 U. S. 586; Tullis v. Lake Erie & Western Railroad, 175 U. S. 348, 175 U. S. 353. Berea College (Berea) (defendant) violated the law.

That such was its intention is evident from the title of the act, which, as we have seen, was "to prohibit white and colored persons from attending the same school." That the act does not violate the Constitution of Kentucky is settled by the decision of its highest court, and the single question for our consideration is whether it conflicts with the federal Constitution. There is no force in the suggestion that the statute, although Ct. Rep. 427; Adair v. United States, 374. See also Loeb v. Township Trustees, 179 U. S. 472, 179 U. S. 490, in which this Court said: "As one section of a statute may be repugnant to the Constitution without rendering the whole act void, so one provision of a section may be invalid by reason of its not conforming to the Constitution, while all the other provisions may be subject to not constitutional infirmity. Those were actions upon promissory notes and an open account. But it is unnecessary for us to consider anything more than the question of its validity as applied to corporation. , 45 S. L. ed. We need concern ourselves only with the inquiry whether the first section can be upheld as coming within the power of a state over its own corporate creatures. 832, 17 Sup. [211 U.S. 45, 54] If it had regarded the authority of the state over its own corporations as being, in itself, and without reference to any other view, sufficient to sustain the statute so far as the defendant corporation is concerned, it need only have said that much and omitted all consideration of the general power of the state to forbid the teaching of the two races together by anybody in the same institution at the same time. (Ky.) 1903, p. 86. (Carroll, Stat.

That statute made certain combinations of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons for certain defined purposes illegal in Illinois. Therefore the Court cannot, as I think, properly forbear to consider the validity of the provisions that refer to teachers who do not represent corporations. The corporation was left in existence. together in the same institution. In the latter case the court said: 'One part [of a statute] may stand, while another will fall, unless the two are so connected or dependent on each other in subject-matter, meaning, or purpose that the good cannot remain without the bad. Kentucky found Berea guilty of the violation and assessed a fine. The statute is clearly separable, and may be valid as to one class while invalid as to another. Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U. S. 466, 107 U. S. 476. If not, then, in determining the intent of the legislature, the provisions of the statute relating to the teaching of the two races together by corporations cannot be separated in its operation from those in the same section that forbid such teaching by individuals and unincorporated associations. This indictment was found under an Act of March 22, 1904 (Acts of Kentucky, 1904, c. 85, p. 181), whose first section reads: "SEC. Co. v. New York, It should adjudge whether the statute, as a whole, is or is not unconstitutional in that it makes it a crime against the state to maintain or operate a private institution of learning where white and black pupils are received at the same time for instruction. 150 U.S. 361 Ct. Rep. 359; Allen v. Arguimbau, Reading the statute as containing a separate prohibition on all corporations, at least, all state corporations, Com. 500, 21 L. ed. No such question is here presented and it need not be now discussed.