berghuis v thompkins

The prosecution must make the additional showing that the accused understood these rights. The fact that Thompkins made a statement about three hours after receiving a Miranda warning does not overcome the fact that he engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver. 11a-12a; see Pet.

He became engaged in the interview, his de meanor changed, and he answered a series of three questions. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U. S. 709, 718, n. 7 (2005). The court observed that a waiver need not be express; it can be "inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated." Id., at 476. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a habeas corpus proceeding challenging a Michigan conviction for first-degree murder and certain other offenses, ruled that there had been two separate constitutional errors in the trial that led to the jury’s guilty verdict.
Here he did neither, so he did not invoke his right to remain silent.

In holding that Mosley’s right had been “ ‘scrupulously honored,’ ” the Court observed that he was properly advised of his rights and indicated his understanding in writing; that police “immediately ceased” interrogation when Mosley stated he did not want to discuss the crime and allowed an “interval of more than two hours” to pass before reapproaching Mosley “at another location about an unrelated [crime]”; and that Mosley was readministered “full and complete Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation” and had a “full and fair opportunity to exercise th[o]se options.” 423 U. S., at 103–105.

Purifoy testified he did not see who fired the weapon because the van was stopped and he was bending over near the floor when shots were fired. denied, 519 U.S. 850 (1996). 170a. v.

v. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole. ’s main protection lies in advising defendants of their rights, see (no evidence that accused understood his

Respondent declined to write anything down, and the interview ended shortly thereafter.

Police are not required to rewarn suspects from time to time. See 28 U.S.C. and ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on the merits. v. Butler, supra, at 376.

Docket No.

441 U. S. 369 Requiring an objectively clear assertion of a suspect's "right to cut off questioning," Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103, respects the suspect's rights while providing clear guidance to the police and permit ting legitimate law enforcement activity. 305 (1985) Butler Pet.

Argued March 1, 2010—Decided June 1, 2010. As a general proposition, the law can presume that an individual who, with a full understanding of his or her rights, acts in a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to relinquish the protection those rights afford.

28 U. S. C. §2254(d)(1). The interview began at approximately 1:30 p.m. and lasted between two and one-half and three hours. He was largely silent during the 3-hour interrogation, but near the end, he answered “yes” when asked if he prayed to God to forgive him for the shooting. supra The broad rules the Court announces today are also troubling because they are unnecessary to decide this case, which is governed by the deferential standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U. S. C. §2254(d).

, at 588. Ibid. At no point during the interrogation did Thompkins say that he wanted to remain silent, that he did not want to talk with the police, or that he wanted an attorney.

465 U. S. 638,

denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 493, 169 L. Ed. Ibid. United States v. Plugh, 576 F. 3d 135, 142 (CA2 2009) (suspect’s refusal to sign waiver-of-rights form “constituted an unequivocally negative answer to the question … whether he was willing to waive his rights”). You are not bound by what his Jury found. App. At worst, it overrules sub silentio an essential aspect of the protections Miranda has long provided for the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. ), cert. You have a right to talk to a lawyer before answering See §2254(a). The interrogation was conducted in a standard-sized room in the middle of the afternoon. 0000058922 00000 n for Cert.


The questions are related, however, in terms of the practical effect on the exercise of a suspect’s rights. 153a; see J.A. Nor are the police re quired to ask questions to clarify an ambiguous refer ence to counsel, although it will often be "good police practice" to do so.

I wish I’d … don’t wish to answer any more questions’ ” ambiguous because conditioned on officer’s implication that suspect committed specific assault). The record contains conflicting evidence about whether Thompkins then verbally confirmed that he understood the rights listed on the form. If he does, the suspect's incriminating answers, even if not immediate, manifest a waiver. 12a, 18a, 144a-145a. Such a result bears little semblance to the “fully effective” prophylaxis, 384 U. S., at 444, that Miranda requires. The court also erred in rejecting the finding of waiver here because of the principle that waiver will not be presumed simply because "a confession was in fact eventually obtained." Jun 1, 2010: 5-4: Kennedy: OT 2009: Holding: The police are required to stop questioning a suspect once he invokes his Miranda right to remain silent. A few minutes later, respondent and his crew pulled up in a van next to France and Morris, so that the passenger side of the van (where respondent sat) was aligned with the driver's side of the car (where Morris sat). 10a, 13a-14a, 150a, he was moved when Officer Helgert appealed to his religious beliefs, J.A. supra Under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, it is indeed difficult to conclude that the state court’s application of our precedents was objectively unreasonable. rights can therefore be waived through means less formal than a typical waiver on the record in a courtroom, cf.

to Pet.

Those rights, the warning made clear, could be asserted at any time. As to the interrogation itself, Helgert candidly characterized it as “very, very one-sided” and “nearly a monologue.” App.

This principle would be inconsistent with a rule that requires a waiver at the outset. Miranda said “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” 384 U. S., at 475; see id., at 470 (“No effective waiver . , at 474). J.A. Butler The police never threatened respondent. Respondent never stated that he did not want to talk with the police. Thompkins declined to sign the form. Id. Respondent's state ments therefore were properly admitted in the State's case in chief at trial. .

If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and the accused made an uncoerced statement, this showing, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate “a valid waiver” of Miranda rights.

To establish prejudice, a “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different,”

B. 1 The interview was not recorded.

Thompkins, who was a suspect, fled. Thompkins answered “Yes” and looked away. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. It stated: “NOTIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND STATEMENT.

Even if it used an incorrect legal standard, this Court need not determine whether AEDPA’s deferential standard of review applies here, since Thompkins cannot show prejudice under

claim was correct under

The Michigan Supreme Court denied discretionary review. While we stopped short in Butler of announcing a per se rule that “the defendant’s silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights,” we reiterated that “courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great.” Ibid.

Respondent read a portion of the Miranda warnings out loud, then told the officers that he understood the warn ings. Or he may be willing to talk about some topics but not others. Click to follow along with the contributions. Judgment: Reversed and remanded, 5-4, in an opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy on June 1, 2010.

Police may well prefer not to seek clarification of an ambiguous statement out of fear that a suspect will invoke his rights. This was consistent with the prosecution’s argument at Thompkins’s trial.

Indeed, we have in the past summarily reversed a state-court decision that inverted Miranda’s antiwaiver presumption, characterizing the error as “readily apparent.” Tague, 444 U. S., at 470–471.

Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. Strickland warnings, understands them, and has an opportunity to invoke the rights before giving any answers or admissions. Respondent "never" said "I'm not talking to you" or "I am not saying anything" or "I don't want to talk to you." , Id., at 11a.

1999), cert. The court noted that respondent "never said he did not want to talk or that he was not going to say anything" and in fact "he continued to talk with the officer[s], albeit sporadi cally." 557 U. S. ___ (2009). A rule demanding pre-interrogation waiver also would be inconsistent with the Court's implied waiver doctrine. v. , .

), cert.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation had obtained statements after advising Butler of his rights and confirming that he understood them. In the court's view, respon dent's "persistent silence for nearly three hours in re sponse to questioning and repeated invitations to tell his side of the story offered a clear and unequivocal mes sage to the officers: [respondent] did not wish to waive his rights."

Thompkins answered “Yes” and looked away. Al though Detective Helgert described the interview as "very, very one-sided," ibid., he stated that respondent occasionally shared "limited verbal responses" with the officers-such as "Yes," "No," or "I don't know"-and communicated nonverbally by making eye contact and nodding his head, J.A. But when, as in this case, a suspect participates in some fashion in interchange with the officers, and the officers reasonably understand him to be engaged (even if sporadically) in conversation, the suspect's failure to answer questions is at best ambiguous and does not amount to an invocation.
Butler App.