1994) (loss of federal benefits); Kratt v. Garvey, 342 F.3d 475, 485 (6th Cir. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. Libretti, 516 U.S. at 50-51 (district court has no obligation to hold a colloquy on a defen dant's waiver of a jury trial to decide forfeiture, but "a district judge must not mislead a defendant regarding the procedures to be followed in determining whether the forfeiture" will be imposed). �@��}�)�fݍ���l<3�H��"�B2

The logic of peti tioner's argument is that, if appointed criminal counsel felt herself insufficiently versed in immigration law (or other relevant collateral matters), a judge would be re quired to appoint additional qualified counsel to provide the advice desired-or risk the defendant's later collat eral challenge to any ensuing conviction. II.

08-651, was whether bad legal advice about a collateral consequence of a guilty plea could amount to ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695 ("An assessment of the likelihood of a result more favorable to the defendant must exclude the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, 'nullification,' and the like. Although peti tioner moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs and his statements, the court denied the motion in full after a hearing at which one of the arresting officers testified. Tr. In light of these principles, misadvice on immigration consequences can rise to the level of deficient perfor mance under Strickland. 1976). The decision whether to plead guilty is personal to the defendant, who alone has the "ultimate authority" to decide to enter a guilty plea. Kentucky describes these decisions isolating an affirmative misadvice claim as “result-driven, incestuous … [,and] completely lacking in legal or rational bases.” Brief for Respondent 31. But even the concomitant entry of a judicial order of removal does not, by itself, ren der the prospect of removal part of the Sixth Amendment jeopardy the defendant faces in the prosecution. endobj App. 1480-1482, 176 L.Ed.2d, at 293-294.. (c) To satisfy Strickland's two-prong inquiry, counsel's representation [176 L.Ed.2d 289] must fall "below an objective standard of reasonableness," id., at 688, 104 S.Ct. App. We agree with Padilla that constitutionally competent counsel would have advised him that his conviction for drug distribution made him subject to automatic deportation. But, as in Hill, and in light of the importance of the prejudice inquiry to the analysis of misadvice claims, a decision applying the prejudice standard to peti tioner's case would provide valuable guidance to the lower courts. 1963) (defendant alleged that loss of right to vote was particularly severe for him because of his position as a union leader). Before deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent counsel."

The Supreme Court of Kentucky rejected Padilla's ineffectiveness claim on the ground that the advice he sought about deportation concerned only collateral matters. The question whether that distinction is appropriate need not be considered in this case because of the unique nature of deportation. 29 0 obj 555, 560 (3d ed. No. J.A. ���)���)�8�qo�n�L 2003); 2 Criminal Practice Manual §§45:3, 45:15 (2009)). 13, §6565(c)(1) (Supp. endobj Official websites use .gov A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decision maker, even if a lawless decision cannot be reviewed."). %���� %PDF-1.3 The preju dice inquiry is founded on the principle that only attor ney errors that affect the outcome of the adversarial process should be grounds for relief, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-and on the recognition that the govern ment's substantial interest in the finality of guilty pleas would be undermined if it were too easy for defendants seeking a better outcome to challenge a plea after the fact, Hill, 474 U.S. at 58. Id., at 30; Strickland, 466 U. S., at 690 (“The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance”); see also State v. Paredez, 2004–NMSC–036, 136 N. M. 533, 538–539. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined. endobj Robert Long, Jr., Counsel of Record, Matthew R. Krygiel, Assistant Attorneys General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, Kentucky, for Respondent. The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the deportation risk. Counsel Must Respect That The Decision Whether To Plead Guilty Belongs To The Defendant Personally. The guarantee of effective assistance of counsel ap plies in all "criminal prosecutions."

lQ%J*'�Iֈ�B埔^R$*a��Vh#�h!u#�@ΖZ�"A��(��E�L,�Fl:�Y�zw�.

1993) (ABA Standards); cf.

The dissenting Justices agreed with the court that a defense lawyer has "no affirmative duty to inform his or her client" about potential immigration consequences of a plea, id. E d. 2d 284 De c i de d Ma r 31, 2010 Just i c e ST E VE NS de l i ve re d t he opi ni on of t he C ourt . at 268; Hill, 474 U.S. at 56.

Penal Code Ann. Pro Forma Immigration Attorneys is located in Denver, CO and serves clients in and around Wheat Ridge, Dupont, Arvada, Englewood, Denver, Westminster, Aurora, Adams County, Arapahoe County, Denver County and Jefferson County. [Footnote 6] See 8 U. S. C. §1229b. x���� However, we concluded that, even though Strickland applied to petitioner’s claim, he had not sufficiently alleged prejudice to satisfy Strickland’s second prong. JOSE PADILLA, PETITIONER. at 25, but believed that "[c]ounsel who gives erroneous advice to a client which influences a felony conviction is worse than no lawyer at all."

<>/Border[0 0 0]/C[0 0 1]>> at 60. (202) 514-2203, Presidential Commission on Law Enforcement. Id., at 55. Congress did not, however, define the term “moral turpitude.”. March 31, 2010. I. See, e.g., Santos-Sanchez, 548 F.3d at 332-333 (no misadvice when counsel stated that conviction "may" result in removal); cf. In its view, neither counsel's failure to advise petitioner about the possibility of removal, nor counsel's incorrect advice, could provide a basis for relief. In its view, seeking a JRAD was “part of the sentencing” process, Janvier, 793 F. 2d, at 452, even if deportation itself is a civil action.

x���-�@D�����Yv��gIP. Id. When a lawyer causes her client to rely on her advice, a similar duty of reasonable competence arises.

Br. endstream

Admin., 429 F.2d 280, 288 (5th Cir.

Pet. But that obligation arises only when removal conse quences are incorporated into the plea agreement or the criminal judgment, because only then is advising a client about removal a part of advocating for her interests within the criminal proceeding. 21 0 obj The record of petitioner's criminal proceeding con clusively demonstrates that petitioner was not preju diced by counsel's alleged misadvice.

Argued October 13, 2009 —Decided March 31, 2010. Because petitioner cannot establish prejudice, the judgment should be affirmed.

denied, 516 U.S. 1058 (1996); see Pt. Br. No.

2009); Wash. Rev.

As the Commonwealth conceded at oral argument, were a defendant’s lawyer to know that a particular offense would result in the client’s deportation and that, upon deportation, the client and his family might well be killed due to circumstances in the client’s home country, any decent attorney would inform the client of the consequences of his plea. We confronted a similar “floodgates” concern in Hill, see id., at 58, but nevertheless applied Strickland to a claim that counsel had failed to advise the client regarding his parole eligibility before he pleaded guilty. Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a collateral consequence. The Commonwealth sought review in the Su preme Court of Kentucky, which reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the judgment of the trial court denying petitioner's motion for collateral relief. 15, 2009); People v. Gutierrez, No. endobj .

Counsel would have to determine which of the myriad adverse conse quences that can flow from a conviction are important to the defendant, and then perform the necessary research to give reasonable advice with respect to each. Id., at 485. Section 19 of the 1917 Act authorized the deportation of “any alien who is hereafter sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral turpitude, committed within five years after the entry of the alien to the United States … .” 39 Stat. 20 0 obj The weight of prevailing professional norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client regarding the risk of deportation.

2003) (no duty to advise on removal); Broomes v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir. §802E–2 (2007); Iowa Rule Crim. Be cause petitioner cannot establish that a rational defen dant in his shoes would have gone to trial if properly advised, the judgment should be affirmed. Padilla relied on his counsel's erroneous advice when he pleaded guilty to the drug charges that made his deportation virtually mandatory. 20–21 (1997); Chin & Holmes, Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev.

VI (2001), any care that they decide to provide is held to professional standards of patient care, see generally Fruiterman v. Granata, 668 S.E.2d 127, 136-137 (Va. 2008); Karen H. Rothenberg, Who Cares? §§ 218A.1421(4)(a), 532.060(2)(c). See also post, at 14 (“I do not mean to suggest that the Sixth Amendment does no more than require defense counsel to avoid misinformation”). But when the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it was here, the duty to give correct advice is equally clear. Such a defendant will therefore be unable to credibly allege that she would not have pleaded guilty but for counsel's failure to advise her about potential immigration conse quences, and thus will almost certainly be unable to es tablish prejudice.