1999) (“Before legalization, large numbers of women in the United States died from unsafe abortions.”); H. Boonstra, R. Gold, C. Richards, & L. Finer, Abortion in Women’s Lives 13, and fig. 05–1382 (Planned Parenthood) respondents are Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Planned Parenthood Golden Gate, and the City and County of San Francisco. [2], Without discussing the constitutional rationale of the Court's prior abortion cases (i.e. Respondents agree the Act encompasses intact D&E, but they contend its additional reach is both unclear and excessive. We do not understand this point to be contested by the parties. The court rejected the Attorney General’s attempt to demonstrate changed evidentiary circumstances since Stenberg and considered itself bound by Stenberg’s conclusion that a health exception was required.

Several did not provide abortion services at all; and one was not even an obgyn… . (plurality opinion) (criticizing Roe’s trimester framework because, inter alia, it “left this Court to serve as the country’s ex officio medical board with powers to approve or disapprove medical and operative practices and standards throughout the United States” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mazurek v. Armstrong,

The court interpreted Stenberg to require a health exception unless “there is consensus in the medical community that the banned procedure is never medically necessary to preserve the health of women.” 435 F. 3d, at 1173. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the Carhart case on February 21, 2006, [12] and agreed to hear the companion Planned Parenthood case on June 19, 2006. 77–79 (1976) 521 U. S. 702. Lower courts had blocked enforcement of the law for violating a woman's right to abortion under privacy concerns within the Fourteenth Amendment, as previously found in the landmark cases Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. Congress determined that the abortion methods it proscribed had a “disturbing similarity to the killing of a newborn infant,” Congressional Findings (14)(L), in notes following 2d, at 923–928, 1025; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp.

Between 85 and 90 percent of the approximately 1.3 million abortions performed each year in the United States take place in the first three months of pregnancy, which is to say in the first trimester. I write separately to reiterate my view that the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, including Casey and Roe v. Wade, 973 (1997)

Papist plots and Commerce Clause conundrums April 19, 2007 | 2:10 pm Time will tell whether Wednesday’s Supreme Court ruling on “partial-birth” abortion is the beginning of a rollback for women’s rights or a self-contained setback for an unusual and unsettling abortion procedure.

Revealing in this regard, the Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices, and consequently suffer from “[s]evere depression and loss of esteem.” Ante, at 29.7 Because of women’s fragile emotional state and because of the “bond of love the mother has for her child,” the Court worries, doctors may withhold information about the nature of the intact D&E procedure. In No.

As Casey comprehended, at stake in cases challenging abortion restrictions is a woman’s “control over her [own] destiny.” 505 U. S., at 869 (plurality opinion).

These facial attacks should not have been entertained in the first instance. This is the proper manner to protect the health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure prohibited by the Act must be used. Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring. 183 (1991) The surgical procedure referred to as “dilation and evacuation” or “D&E” is the usual abortion method in this trimester. The abortions affected by the Act’s regulations take place both previability and postviability; so the quoted language and the undue burden analysis it relies upon are applicable. §1531(b)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. Abortion Federation, supra, at 474–475. 2d, at 923–929; Nat.

.

in No. IV), instead of “ ‘delivering. See also Sabri v. United States,

IV). Abortion Federation, 437 F. 3d, at 296 (Walker, C. J., concurring) (explaining the standard under Stenberg “is a virtually insurmountable evidentiary hurdle”).

18 U. S. C. §1531(a). See also Stenberg, 530 U. S., at 923–927; National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp. Denning, Brannon P., Gonzales v. Carhart: An Alternate Opinion. The solution the Court approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks. Roe’s focus was in considerable measure on “vindicat[ing] the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment.” Id., at 165. Congressional Findings (1), in notes following It cannot be said that the Act “vests virtually complete discretion in the hands of [law enforcement] to determine whether the [doctor] has satisfied [its provisions].” Kolender, supra, at 358 (invalidating a statute regulating loitering). Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, which mentions saving for another day the issue of whether Congress had sufficient power under the Commerce Clause to enact this ban. 492 U. S. 490, I don’t close them quite so much, and I just gently draw the tissue out attempting to have an intact delivery, if possible.” App. Gonzales v. Carhart , 550 U.S. 124 (2007), is a United States Supreme Court case that upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003. First Amendment context is inapplicable here.

525 (1994) Upon a motion of the defendant, the court shall delay the beginning of the trial for not more than 30 days to permit such a hearing to take place. It satisfies both requirements of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. These doctors then grasp the head with forceps, crush it, and remove it.

Following this Court’s Stenberg v. Carhart, See also id., at 877 (plurality opinion) (“[M]eans chosen by the State to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform the woman’s free choice, not hinder it.”); supra, at 3–4. 410 U. S. 113 (1973) This was not an idle assertion. But the congressional record includes letters from numerous individual physicians stating that pregnant women’s health would be jeopardized under the Act, as well as statements from nine professional associations, including ACOG, the American Public Health Association, and the California Medical Association, attesting that intact D&E carries meaningful safety advantages over other methods. 2d, at 923–928, 1026; National Abortion Federation, 330 F. Supp. 385 (2005)

Id., at 951 (Ginsburg, J., concurring);cf. The procedure that prompted the federal Act and various state statutes, including Nebraska’s, is a variation of the standard D&E, and is herein referred to as “intact D&E.” The main difference between the two procedures is that in intact D&E a doctor extracts the fetus intact or largely intact with only a few passes, pulling out its entire body instead of ripping it apart. It is apparent Congress responded to these concerns because the Act adopts the phrase “delivers a living fetus,” 505 U. S. 833 (1992) Carhart, supra, at 868–869; App. §1531(c). as Amici Curiae in No.

The evidence also supports a legislative determination that an intact delivery is almost always a conscious choice rather than a happenstance. 395 (1979) Whether the Act creates such risks was, however, a contested factual question below: The evidence presented in the trial courts and before Congress demonstrates both sides have medical support for their positions. Even after applying a deferential standard of review to Congress’ factual findings, the Court of Appeals determined “substantial disagreement exists in the medical community regarding whether” the procedures prohibited by the Act are ever necessary to preserve a woman’s health. in No. There, the Court concluded that the statute encompassed D&E, which “often involve[s] a physician pulling a ‘substantial portion’ of a still living fetus … , say, an arm or leg, into the vagina prior to the death of the fetus,” 530 U. S., at 939, and rejected the Nebraska Attorney General’s limiting interpretation that the statute’s reference to a “procedure” that “kill[s] the unborn child” was to a distinct procedure, not to the abortion procedure as a whole, id., at 943. Haskell went in with forceps and grabbed the baby’s legs and pulled them down into the birth canal. Id., at 1048. This traditional rule is consistent with Casey, which confirms the State’s interest in promoting respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy. §28–326(9) (Supp. In 2003, after this Court’s decision in Stenberg, Congress passed the Act at issue here. 2000) (defining deliver as “[t]o assist a woman in childbirth” and “[t]o extract from an enclosed place, as the fetus from the womb, an object or foreign body”); see also I. Dox, B. Melloni, G. Eisner, & J. Melloni, The HarperCollins Illustrated Medical Dictionary 160 (4th ed. Abortion Federation, supra, at 465; Planned Parenthood, supra, at 962.

2d 957 (2004). It was reasonable for Congress to think that partial-birth abortion, more than standard D&E, “undermines the public’s perception of the appropriate role of a physician during the delivery process, and perverts a process during which life is brought into the world.” Congressional Findings (14)(K), in notes following Instead of drawing the line at viability, the Court refers to Congress’ purpose to differentiate “abortion and infanticide” based not on whether a fetus can survive outside the womb, but on where a fetus is anatomically located when a particular medical procedure is performed. It invalidated the Act. LeRoy Harrison Carhart is an American physician from New Jersey best known for performing abortions late in pregnancy. Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child. 18 U. S. C. §1531 (2000 ed., Supp. her place in society.” 505 U. S., at 851–852. See §1531(b)(1)(B). In addition it did “not believe that many of [the plaintiffs’] purported reasons for why [intact D&E] is medically necessary [were] credible; rather [it found them to be] theoretical or false.” Id., at 480. 207 (1977) 1202, notes following CATO Supreme Court Review, p. 167, 2006-2007, Available at SSRN: If you need immediate assistance, call 877-SSRNHelp (877 777 6435) in the United States, or +1 212 448 2500 outside of the United States, 8:30AM to 6:00PM U.S. Eastern, Monday - Friday.

The Act does not regulate the most common abortion procedures used in the first trimester of pregnancy, when the vast majority of abortions take place. Keywords: abortion, Commerce Clause, federalism, Carhart, Gonzales, Supreme Court, Morrison, Lopez, Raich 2d, at 1001. 1, National Coalition for Men v. Selective Service System, Respondents have not demonstrated that the, Kennedy, joined by Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Ginsburg, joined by Stevens, Souter, Breyer. But Casey makes clear that, in determining whether any restriction poses an undue burden on a “large fraction” of women, the relevant class is not “all women,” nor “all pregnant women,” nor even all women “seeking abortions.” 505 U. S., at 895. 511 U. S. 513. Congress was concerned, furthermore, with the effects on the medical community and on its reputation caused by the practice of partial-birth abortion. In a legal sense, the case distinguished but did not overrule Stenberg v. Carhart (2000), in which the Court dealt with related issues. The most common first-trimester abortion method is vacuum aspiration (otherwise known as suction curettage) in which the physician vacuums out the embryonic tissue. Casey, in short, struck a balance. 2.2 (2006) (“as late as 1965, illegal abortion still accounted for an estimated … 17% of all officially reported pregnancy-related deaths”; “[d]eaths from abortion declined dramatically after legalization”). 439 U. S. 379, We granted certiorari. 1321, 1328 (2000). Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision.

Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n, 546 U. S. ___, ___.