in regents of the university of california v bakke the supreme court determined that

Id., at 431 (emphasis added). 3d 34, 54-55, 553 P.2d 1152, 1166 (1976) (footnote omitted). Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 381; Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1965). The remaining four justices held that the use of race as a criterion in admissions decisions in higher education was constitutionally permissible. [23] 110 Cong. 2467 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay). Its language is explicit: "No State shall . [27] Ibid.

*272 I also conclude for the reasons stated in the following opinion that the portion of the court's judgment enjoining petitioner from according any consideration to race in its admissions process must be reversed.

[57] Negroes and Chicanos alone constitute approximately 22% of California's population. [97] Law professor and future judge Robert Bork wrote in the pages of The Wall Street Journal that the justices who had voted to uphold affirmative action were "hard-core racists of reverse discrimination". Regents of Univ. In that situation, plaintiff must establish an intent to discriminate. "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality . Art. 409, to Alma Motor Co. v. Timken-Detroit Axle Co. [,329 U.S. 129,] and the Hatch Act case [United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75] decided this term, this Court has followed a policy of strict necessity in disposing of constitutional issues. ." 329 (1977); Seeburger, A Heuristic Argument Against Preferential Admissions, 39 U. Pitt. Many questions, such as whether the Fourteenth Amendment barred only de jure discrimination or in at least some circumstances reached de facto discrimination, had not yet received an authoritative judicial resolution. Supreme Court of United States. For, in addition, `the Court [has] developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.' Petitioner does not object to Bakke's standing, but inasmuch as this charge concerns our jurisdiction under Art. But what standard is the Court to apply when a rejected applicant of Japanese ancestry brings suit to require the University of Washington to extend the same privileges to his group? Although many of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment conceived of its primary function as bridging the vast distance between members of the Negro race and the white "majority," Slaughter-House Cases, supra, the Amendment itself was framed in universal terms, without reference to color, ethnic origin, or condition of prior servitude. It is necessary to decide which, if any, of these purposes is substantial enough to support the use of a suspect classification. As the first Mr. Justice Harlan said in his prophetic dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559: "So—I say to Senators—must be our Government. Indeed, in this context there can be no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment does command color blindness and forbids the use of racial criteria. Id., at 49, 553 P.2d, at 1162-1163. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means. [53] See e. g., Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. App. All we are asked to do is to pronounce the constitutionality of what Davis has done. The petitioners in United Jewish Organizations certainly complained bitterly of their reapportionment treatment, and I rather doubt that they regard the "remedy" there imposed as one that was "to improve" the group's ability to participate, as MR. JUSTICE POWELL describes it, ante, at 305. 3d 34, 64, 553 P.2d 1152, 1172 (1976). Formal action to compel compliance can only take place after the following has occurred: first, there must be an unsuccessful attempt to obtain voluntary compliance; second, there must be an administrative hearing; third, a written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action must be filed with the appropriate committees of the House and Senate; and fourth, 30 days must have elapsed between such filing and the action denying benefits under a Federal program.

. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke was the Supreme Court's first major opinion on the constitutionality of government affirmative action preferences.

Moreover, it is clear from our cases that there are limits beyond which majorities may not go when they classify on the basis of immutable characteristics. . So long as the university proceeds on an individualized, case-by-case basis, there is no warrant for judicial interference in the academic process. 252, provides as follows: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.". Have students read and react to the following selection: In That year was the earliest year of involvement for 34% of the schools; an additional 66% became involved during the years 1969 to 1973. Record 171. [6] The following table provides a year-by-year comparison of minority admissions at the Davis Medical School: Id., at 216-218.

Id., at 226. [9] The plain language of the statute therefore requires affirmance of the judgment below. Cf. 6, California, Tables 139, 140.

[20] The general counsel for the University of California said, "I don't think Storandt meant to injure the university. We got rid of the “sins of the father” thing a century ago. The dream of America as the great melting pot has *401 not been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he never even made it into the pot. But who is to say that victimization is not present for some members of today's minority groups, although it is of a lesser and perhaps different degree. [2] To allow a private *383 individual to sue to cut off funds under Title VI would compromise these assurances and short circuit the procedural preconditions provided in Title VI. B to Application for Stay A19-A20. . Those whose societal injury is thought to exceed some arbitrary level of tolerability then would be entitled to preferential classifications at the expense of individuals belonging to other groups. Just last year Congress enacted legislation[22] explicitly requiring that no grants shall be made "for any local public works project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary [of Commerce] that at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises." In declining to so hold, today's judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred years Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. See Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). [34] In the view of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, the pliable notion of "stigma" is the crucial element in analyzing racial classifications.

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U. S., at 380-381; *350 Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-244 (1972). ; by Robert J. Willey for the Cleveland State University Chapter of the Black American Law Students Assn. The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element.

See, e. g., Weber, supra. To the extent that it purports to do anything else, I respectfully dissent. The generation of minority students applying to Davis Medical School since it opened in 1968—most of whom *372 were born before or about the time Brown I was decided— clearly have been victims of this discrimination. But there is no basis for preferring a particular preference program simply because in achieving the same goals that the Davis Medical School is pursuing, it proceeds in a manner that is not immediately apparent to the public.

*417 As with other provisions of the Civil Rights Act, Congress' expression of its policy to end racial discrimination may independently proscribe conduct that the Constitution does not.

With respect to respondent's entitlement to an injunction directing his admission to the Medical School, petitioner has conceded that it could not carry its burden of proving that, but for the existence of its unlawful special admissions program, respondent still would not have been admitted. Id., at 163. After the second rejection, Bakke filed the instant suit in the Superior Court of California. 90-91 (1964). Section 2000d-5 provides that "for the purpose of determining whether a local educational agency is in compliance with [Title VI], compliance by such agency with a final order or judgment of a Federal court for the desegregation of the school or school system operated by such agency shall be deemed to be compliance with [Title VI], insofar as the matters covered in the order or judgment are concerned."