1005 (1896). By conferring a permanent preference, the legislation allows veterans to invoke their advantage repeatedly, without regard to their date of discharge. Chapter 31, § 23, requires, however, that disabled veterans, veterans, and surviving spouses and surviving parents of veterans be ranked—in the order of their respective scores—above all other candidates.10. Those principles apply with equal force to a case involving alleged gender discrimination. 276-278.

The first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is not gender-based.

This is one. First, it is wholly at odds with the District Court's central finding that Massachusetts has not offered a preference to veterans for the purpose of discriminating against women.

251, 254, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). The district court found that the preference operated overwhelmingly to the advantage of males. 356 (1922). And it cannot seriously be argued that the Legislature of Massachusetts could have been unaware that most veterans are men. The State of Massachusetts enacted a veteran preference statute providing that all veterans qualified for state civil service positions must be considered for appointment ahead of any qualifying non-veterans. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265, 97 S.Ct. Unlock this case brief with a free (no-commitment) trial membership of Quimbee. 143. 642, § 2 (World War II); 1954 Mass.

See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-317, 97 S.Ct. Apart from the facts that the definition of "veterans" in the statute has always been neutral as to gender and that Massachusetts has consistently defined veteran status in a way that has been inclusive of women who have served in the military, this is not a law that can plausibly be explained only as a gender-based classification. 725, § 2(e); 1965 Mass. Ibid.

"The names of persons who pass examinations for appointment to any position classified under the civil service shall be placed upon the eligible lists in the following order:—, "(1) Disabled veterans .

For example, a point preference system, such as that maintained by many States and the Federal Government, see n. 2, supra, or an absolute preference for a limited duration, would reward veterans without excluding all qualified women from upper level civil service positions. She has also acknowledged that state hiring preferences for veterans are not per se invalid, for she has limited her challenge to the absolute lifetime preference that Massachusetts provides to veterans. 1021, 51 L.Ed.2d 270; Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 99 S.Ct. Pp. 278-280. 1764, 36 L.Ed.2d 583; cf. But in this inquiry—made as it is under the Constitution—an inference is a working tool, not a synonym for proof. Cf. "Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. Acts, ch. . To the contrary, it confers upon a specifically described group—perceived to be particularly deserving—a competitive headstart. To the contrary, the statutory history shows that the benefit of the preference was consistently offered to "any person" who was a veteran.

The appellee, however, has simply failed to demonstrate that the law in any way reflects a purpose to discriminate on the basis of sex. See generally Binkin and Bach 4-21. Acts, ch. 31 codification in effect when this litigation was commenced. 1055, 1062-1063, 35 L.Ed.2d 282 (1973); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. .

. POWELLARCHIVES 78-233. 485, 490, 495-499 (Mass.1976); Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F.Supp. 31, § 23, on the ground that it discriminates against women in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. Of the women appointed, 1.8% were veterans, while 54% of the men had veteran status. Given this finding, simple logic suggests than an intent to exclude women from significant public jobs was not at work in this law."

The veterans' hiring preference in Massachusetts, as in other jurisdictions, has traditionally been justified as a measure designed to reward veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from military to civilian life, to encourage patriotic service, and to attract loyal and well-disciplined people to civil service occupations.12 See, e. g., Hutcheson v. Director of Civil Service, 361 Mass. Although public employment is not a constitutional right, Massachusetts Bd. Contributor Names Stewart, Potter (Judge) Supreme Court of the United States (Author) Created / … Read more about Quimbee. Davis upheld a job-related employment test that white people passed in proportionately greater numbers than Negroes, for there had been no showing that racial discrimination entered into the establishment or formulation of the test. 190 (S.D.N.Y.1974) (upholding, inter alia, nondurational residency requirement in New York veterans' preference statute), summarily aff'd, 417 U.S. 901, 94 S.Ct. Only four States afford a preference comparable in scope to that of Massachusetts. Ibid. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597, which held that a neutral law does not violate the Equal Protection Clause solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact and that, instead, the disproportionate impact must be traced to a purpose to discriminate on the basis of race. § 11:27-4 (West 1976); S.D.Comp.Laws Ann. 1281; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that its effects upon women are disproportionably adverse, a twofold inquiry is thus appropriate. 451 F.Supp., at 151 (Campbell, J., concurring). 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491; San Antonio School Dist. Ante, at 277. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. View Case; Cited Cases; Citing Case ; 429 U.S. 66 (1976) ... (now designated "Personnel Administrator of the Commonwealth") and members of the Massachusetts Civil Service Commission, declaring unconstitutional the Massachusetts veterans' preference statute, Mass. 815. Individuals in general and lawmakers in particular frequently act for a variety of reasons.
393, and the veterans' preference is now found at Mass.Gen.Laws Ann., ch. Among the better known are Molly Pitcher (Revolutionary War), Deborah Sampson (Revolutionary War), and Lucy Brewer (War of 1812).

See Fleming & Shanor, Veterans' Preferences and Public Employment: Unconstitutional Gender Discrimination?, 26 Emory L.J. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATOR OF MASSACHUSETTS et al., Appellants, v. Helen B. FEENEY. 31, § 26 (West 1979). See J. Laffin, Women in Battle 116-122 (1967). Feeney (plaintiff) was a female non-veteran applicant for the civil service that scored very highly on a number of competitive civil service exams. Finding that a more modest preference formula would readily accommodate the State's interest in aiding veterans, the court declared ch. 31, § 26 (West 1979).

Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F.Supp.

The equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the States all power of classification. Where a law's consequences are that inevitable, can they meaningfully be described as unintended?" 627, § 5. certification, or any law or regulation, shall call for persons of one sex, those of that sex shall be certified; otherwise sex shall be disregarded in certification").
See M. Binkin & S. Bach, Women and the Military 5 (1977) (hereinafter Binkin and Bach). No statutory claim was brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 271-273. 1225, 1231, 43 L.Ed.2d 514 (1975). 1884 Mass.