After observing respondent Edward Strieff leave the residence, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff at a nearby parking lot, identifying himself and asking Strieff what he was doing at the house. 4430, 26 Fla.L.Weekly Fed. In some cases, for example, the link between the unconstitutional conduct and the discovery of the evidence is too attenuated to justify suppression. After the unlawful stop, his conduct was lawful, and there is no indication that the stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police misconduct. These visits were sufficiently frequent to raise his suspicion that the occupants were dealing drugs. Second, it is unlikely that the prevalence of outstanding warrants will lead to dragnet searches by police. After observing respondent Edward Strieff leave the residence, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff at a nearby parking lot, identifying himself and asking Strieff what he was doing at the house. Second, the court stressed the absence of flagrant misconduct by Officer Fackrell, who was conducting a legitimate investigation of a suspected drug house. The third factor, " the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct," id., at 604.

15. Officer Fackrell observed Strieff exit the house and walk toward a nearby convenience store. ?Argued February 22, 2016?Decided June 20, 2016. To enforce the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against " unreasonable searches and seizures," this Court has at times required courts to exclude evidence obtained by unconstitutional police conduct. 102 (quoting United States v. Simpson, 439 F.3d 490, 496 (CA8 2006). Held:?The evidence Officer Fackrell seized incident to Strieff?s arrest is admissible based on an application of the attenuation factors from Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.?S. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor conceded that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop but argued that the evidence should not be suppressed because the existence of a valid arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the discovery of the contraband. Pp.?4?5. The court found that the short time between the illegal stop and the search weighed in favor of suppressing the evidence, but that two countervailing considerations made it admissible. 586 .

(a) As the primary judicial remedy for deterring Fourth Amendment violations, the exclusionary rule encompasses both the " primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure" and, relevant here, " evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality." Second, it is unlikely that the prevalence of outstanding warrants will lead to dragnet searches by police. Strieff, 579 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States limited the scope of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. The State charged Strieff with unlawful possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. In this case, there was no flagrant police misconduct. 590 . App.

The trial court denied the motion, and the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed.

Strieff conflates the standard for an illegal stop with the standard for flagrancy, which requires more than the mere absence of proper cause. 2419 (2011), WEEKS v. UNITED STATES, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), PETER v. NANTKWEST, INC., 589 U.S. ___ (2019), MITCHELL v. WISCONSIN, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE v. NEW YORK, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).

S 288, UTAH, PETITIONER v. EDWARD JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR. Tyler R. Green and John F. Bash argued the cause for petitioner. One exception is the attenuation doctrine, which provides for admissibility when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance. Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C.?J., and Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. First, the court considered the presence of a valid arrest warrant to be an " 'extraordinary intervening circumstance.'" That warrant authorized Officer Fackrell to arrest Strieff, and once the arrest was authorized, his search of Strieff incident to that arrest was undisputedly lawful.

Pp.?4?10. Narcotics detective Douglas Fackrell investigated the tip.

321 . Below Argument Opinion Vote Author Term; 14-1373: Utah : Feb 22, 2016 Tr. Detective Fackrell conducted surveillance on a South Salt Lake City residence based on an anonymous tip about drug dealing. Following is the case brief for Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016) Case Summary of Utah v. Strieff: A police officer, suspecting that a house was being used for drug transactions, stopped Strieff when he walked out of the house. Oral Argument - February 22, 2016; Opinion Announcement - June 20, 2016; Opinions. Decided by Roberts Court . In contrast, the second factor, ?the presence of intervening circumstances, id., at 603?604, strongly favors the State. In the store's parking lot, Officer Fackrell detained Strieff, identified himself, and asked Strieff what he was doing at the residence. 2060] One of those visitors was respondent Edward Strieff. The existence of a valid [195 L.Ed.2d 405] warrant, predating the investigation and entirely unconnected with the stop, favors finding sufficient attenuation between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence. Pp. Strieff conditionally pleaded guilty to reduced charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, but reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of the suppression... __ U.S. __ (2016), 14-1373, Utah v. Strieff. for Cert. (1)?Three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.?S. But to ensure that those deterrence benefits are not outweighed by the rule's substantial social costs, there are several exceptions to the rule. Op. But the Court has also held that, even when there is a Fourth Amendment violation, this exclusionary rule does not apply when the costs of exclusion outweigh its deterrent benefits.

The first, " temporal proximity" between the initially unlawful stop and the search, id., at 603. Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible because it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop. Officer Fackrell was at most negligent, but his errors in judgment hardly rise to a purposeful or flagrant violation of Strieff's Fourth Amendment rights. He observed visitors who left a few minutes after arriving at the house. 590 , lead to this conclusion. The doctrine therefore applies here, where the intervening circumstance is the discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant. We hold that the evidence the officer seized as part of the search incident to arrest is admissible because the officer's discovery of the arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized incident to arrest. (2)?Strieff?s counterarguments are unpersuasive. NOTE:?Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.?S.

Segura v. United States, 468 U.?S. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.?S. Such misconduct would expose police to civil liability and, in any event, is already accounted for by Brown 's " purpose and flagrancy" factor.

(b) As a threshold matter, the attenuation doctrine is not limited to the defendant's independent acts. v. EDWARD JOSEPH STRIEFF, JR Strieff conditionally pleaded guilty to reduced charges of attempted possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia, but reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of the suppression, __ U.S. __, 136 S.Ct. Such misconduct would expose police to civil liability and, in any event, is already accounted for by Brown?s ?purpose and flagrancy? As part of the stop, Officer Fackrell requested Strieff's identification, and Strieff produced his Utah identification card. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, favors suppressing the evidence. [136 S.Ct. The state argued that Fackrell's misconduct arose solely from an inadvertent procedural error.

Strieff moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that it was derived from an unlawful investigatory stop. Audio Transcription for Oral Argument - February 22, 2016 in Utah v. Strieff Audio Transcription for Opinion Announcement - June 20, 2016 in Utah v. Strieff John G. Roberts, Jr.: And Justice Thomas has our opinion this morning in case 14-1373 Utah versus Strieff. In contrast, the second factor, " the presence of intervening circumstances, id., at 603-604, 95 S.Ct. One exception is the attenuation doctrine, which provides for admissibility when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is sufficiently remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance. The existence of a valid [195 L.Ed.2d 405] warrant, predating the investigation and entirely unconnected with the stop, favors finding sufficient attenuation between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of evidence. [195 L.Ed.2d 404] The number of people he observed making brief visits to the house over the course of a week made him suspicious that the occupants were dealing drugs. But to ensure that those deterrence benefits are not outweighed by the rule?s substantial social costs, there are several exceptions to the rule. Sotomayor, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III. (1) Three factors articulated in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. Officer Fackrell?s purpose was not to conduct a suspicionless fishing expedition but was to gather information about activity inside a house whose occupants were legitimately suspected of dealing drugs.

2060] One of those visitors was respondent Edward Strieff.

Therefore, Officer Fackrell?s discovery of a valid, pre-existing, and untainted arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unconstitutional investigatory stop and the evidence seized incident to a lawful arrest. Assuming, without deciding, that Officer Fackrell lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Strieff initially, the discovery of that arrest warrant attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop and the evidence seized from Strieff incident to his arrest. Strieff conflates the standard for an illegal stop with the standard for flagrancy, which requires more than the mere absence of proper cause. 2159, 165 L.Ed.2d 56. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416, lead to this conclusion. 2058] an unlawful investigatory stop. Over the course of about a week, Officer Fackrell conducted intermittent surveillance of the home.